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ABSTRACT
The challenges of Space Shuttle Orbiter reaction control subsystem development began with selec-
tion of the propellant for the subsystem. Various concepts were evaluated before the current Earth-
storable, bipropellant combination was selected. Once that task was accomplished, additional chal-
lenges of designing the system to satisfy the wide range of requirements dictated by operating en-
vironments, reusability, and long life were met. Verification of system adequacy was achieved by
means of a combination of analysis and test. The studies, the design efforts, and the test and anal-
ysis techniques employed in meeting the challenges are described in this paper.
INTRODUCT,_ON
The requirements for the Space Shuttle Orbiter reaction control subsystem (RCS) were replete
with challenges; however, four reQuire_nts had the greatest impact on system development: (I) a
fail-operational/fail-safe design, (2) 10 years of life, (3) a 100-mission reuse capability, and
(4) the capability for operation both in orbit and during reentry. The requirement of a fail-
operational/fail-safe design not only introduced the complexity of additional hardware but, perhaps
more importantly, introduced a complex, critical redundancy management (RM) system. The calendar
life and reuse requirements posed problems in material selection and material compatibility and in
ground handling and turnaround procedures, as well as classical wearout problems. The requirement
for both on-orbit and entry operation complicated propellant-tank acquisition system design.
Because requirements did not identify the need for a specific propellant or propellant Combina-
tion, an early issue that had to be resolved was that of selecting propellants. The ultimate propel-
lant selection had a significant impact on the four requirements identified previously.
In subsequent sections of this paper, the most significant challenges incurred in development of
the Orbiter RCS are identified and the manner in which those challenges were met in the ultimate cer-
tification of the system for operational flight is described.
PROPELLANT SELECTION
One of the first major issues to be resolved concerning the Space Shuttle Orbiter RCS was that
of selecting the propellant(s) to be used. Early in the program definition phase, oxygen (02) and
hydrogen (H2) were baselined as the reactants for all propulsion and power systems. This choice was
made for a number of reasqns. As a propellant combination, 02-H 2 provides high specific impulse.
Logistics are simplified and less costly with a single propellant combination for all vehicle propul-
sion systems. The exhaust products are noncorrosive, and the propellants are relatively clean and
nontoxic - all attributes desired in a reusable system. As a result of the oxygen/hydrogen baselin-
ing, all early technologywork addressed improving the technolo_ posture of 02-H 2 systems. This
improvement was necessary because 02-H2 systems were far from state of the art when used for reac-
tion control purposes. As the component technology and systems study programs progressed, the
weight advantage thought to exist with 02-H2 propellant systems gradually diminished. The heavy
accumulators (t_ per system) in combination with redundant turbopun_os (six per system) and heat
exchangers (six per system) offset the weight advantage afforded by the better performance in the
total impulse range being considered. Because system dry weight was high, the 02-H2 systems also
added to the vehicle landing weight penalty.
A further ifactor that became more and more apparent as technology work progressed was that the
oxygen-hydrogen systems would be very expensive to develop and build as well as extremely complex
systems to operate. The complexity generated real concerns wlth respect to the reliability of the
overall system. When it became clear that the weight of the 02-H 2 system would be no better than
that of a monopropellent system (fig. 1), the baseline was changed to a monopropellant hydrazine sys-
tem to reduce cost and complexity. The monopropellant system baseline was retained through the award
of the Orbiter prime contract. As the Orbiter design evolved and the total impulse requirement
approached 2 million pound-seconds, performance again became a more important factor and'the trade
swung in favor of the bipropellant (monomethyl hydrazine (MMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO)) systems,
which were still lighter and much cheaper and simpler than 02-H 2 systems. Another factor being con-
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FIGURE 1.- WEIGHT AS A FUNCTION OF TOTAL IMPULSE FOR CANDIDATE PROPELLANTS.
sidered at the time was the potential for integration of the RCS with the orbital maneuvering sys-
tem (OM$), which also used the MMH/NTO propellant combination. This propellant combination ultl-
mately was selected because of the favorable weight trade-off, the reasonable development cost, and -
the minimal development risk.
COMPONENT OE_ELOPMENT CHALLENGES
During the course of readying each component for flight, a distinct set of development and certi-
fication problems arose. Some were the result of well-defined, but rigid requirements. Others were
the result of ill-deflned or changing requirements; still others were the result of being unable to
readily demonstrate satisfaction of requirements. Some of the more significant challenges encounter-
ed during the development of the Orbiter RCS components are described next.
SHUTrLE ORBITER RCS PROPELLANT TANKS
For a number of reasons, Orbtter Program management selected a tank concept employing a screen
propellant acquisition device (PAD), which is used to acquire and deliver gas-free liquid to the
thrusters..In previous spacecraft, a Teflon membrane was used to separate the propellant from the
pressurant. However, Teflon membranes rupture after relatively few expulstve cycles and, therefore,
would be unsuitable for lO0-mtsston ltfe. No elastome_ic membranes that are sufficiently compatible
wtth the RCS propellants to assure a lO-_ar life have been developed. For these reasons, and be-
cause of its weight advantage over the bellows-type tanks, a screen tank was chosen to provide gas-
free liquid outflow. See figures 2 and 3 for the forward and aft configuration tanks, respectively.
This device works by using the surface tension of the liquid to form a barrier to the pressurant gas.
The PAD is made up of channels which are covered with a very finely woven stainless steel mesh, or
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FIGURE 2.- FORW_D TANK. FIGURE 3.- AFT TANK.
screen. Contact with liquid wets the screen, and the surface tension of the liquid prevents the pas-
sage of gas. The strength of the liquid barrier is finite, and the pressure differential at which
gas will be forced through the wetted screen is called the bubble point. When the bubble point is
exceeded, the screen is said to %reak down," or to transfer gas. However, if the pressure differ-
_nce is less than the bubble point, gas cannot penetrate the liquid barrier and only liquid will be
pulled through into the channels. Therefore, the goal in designing the tank is to minimize the pres-
sure loss while maximizing the amount of propellant expelled, or expulsion efficiency. The pressure
loss is made up of two major components: the flow loss, due to viscous los_., turning loss, entrance
loss, etc., and the hydrostatic head loss" (fig. 4). The latter is a function of the acceleration to
which the tank is subjected. The flow losses depend on the puddle size. As the volume of propellant
decreases, the screen surface area in contact with the puddle decreases; thus, to supply the same vol-
ome flow rate, the velocity must be greater and, therefore, the pressure differential must be greater.
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The greatest flow losses occur with the smallest puddle. The expulsion efficiency of a tank is
defined as the smallest residual at which the flow and hydrostatic head-pressure losses, combined,
are equal to the bubble point of the screen. Because the tank is designed to work primarily in a
Iow-g environment, the hydrostatic head-pressure term is small. However, any grofmnd testing has to
be performed in a one-g environment, and the hydrostatic head-pressure loss very quickly becomes the
dominant term and, therefore, the tank performance cannot be directly determined or demonstrated in
ground tests. This problem was the greatest engineering challenge encountered in the tank develop-
ment program.
To get around this problem, sophisticated math models were developed to characterize the on-
orbit perfohnance of the tank. The math models were developed using ground test of subassemblies
in which flow losses o_ each device in the PAD were measured.
In early 1980, testing at the system level revealed a serious deficiency in the math models. In
addition to the steady-state pressure drops, a transient-pressure drop, due to'thruster pulsinq, was
discovered. This loss had not been considered in previous analyses and was unexpected• An addition-
al analysis indicated that when combinations of thrusters were commanded simultaneously, the pressure
drop associated with the opening of the thruster valves was being transmitted through the supply lines
to the tank. There, the analysis showed, the pressure drops were high enough, with more than three
thrusters pulsing, to cause gas ingestion and momentary screen breakdown. Because of the transient
problem, gas could be fed out to the thruster and perhaps cause a thruster to misfire and be de-
selected during a critical mission phase. To avoid _his possibility, the number of thrusters which
could be simultaneously commanded per system was constrained to three thrusters for all mission phases
except entry and return to landing site (RTLS) abort. _ For entry, the acceleration vector causes the
propellant to cover the outlet; therefore, np transient problem is encountered. The RTLS case, how-
ever, still required seven thrusters. To satisfy this requirement, it was necessary to "overfill"
the aft RCS tanks. Overfill means that the tanks are loaded completely full leaving no ullage volume;
therefore, the upper compartment screens are entirely wet and the risk of gas ingestion is almost
eliminated. However, overfill entailed a lengthy list of operational problems and procedures and it
was viewed as a temporary solution to the transient problem.
Shortly after the problem was discovered, an intensive effort was initiated to quantify the tran-
sient problem. Again, because the tank performance could not be defined by direct test in a one-g en-
vironment, an advanced transient-pressure math model was developed. It was then correlated with pre-
liminary test data obtained by the contractor from tests on a tank in one g using a test fluid and
simulated thruster valves. A more detailed model-validation test plan was then developed using a
tank that was specially instrumented with highly sensitive pressure transducers, and a test entitled
"0V-I02 Aft RCS Tank On-Orbit Performance Test" was run. This test provided pressure transient data
from an actual _ystem. The tests were run in the worst case attitude and, because of the large hydro-
static head-pressure loss, with a large residual puddle. The math model predictions for one-g opera-
tion agreed fairly closely with the test results, and the model was then used to predict the expul-
sion efficiency of the tanks for on-orbit conditions. A conservative safety factor was included in
the predicted on-orbit performance to account for test uncertainties.
The "on-orbit" tests, along with the math model, indicated that the abort duct in the aft RCS -
tank was the device most affected by start transients in the upper compartment and also was the de-
vice that determined the entry expulsion efficiency. Because the abort dump for which it was
designed had been eliminated, it was decided to renK)ve this abort duct from the 0V-099 tank. With
this change, the updated math model indicated that the upper compartment would not be sensitive to
on-orbit pressure transients after the screen_are Initially wetted. To test this prediction, and
also to test the OV-Ogg modification tank, a ne_@test concept was proposed. (See fig. 5.) A way had
been found to minimize the test uncertainty due to hydrostatic head-pressure loss and to simulate the
worst case "terminal" puddle in a one-g envlronn_nt. By wrapping the screen channels with Teflon
tape, leaving a small area uncovered at the bottom of the tank and the aft entry collector uncovered,
a simulated Iow-g expulsion test could be run. With the collector as a high point, and with liquid
filled until the level is Just below it, thrusters are fired. Because only a small screen area is
exposed to propellant flow, the steady-state and transient losses are maximized, Because the height
below the collector is sma11, the hydrostatic head-pressure loss is minimized and thus on-orbit condi-
tions are simulated. The initial results indicated that the tank was performing better than the math
model predictions. The math model developed for the forward tanks indicated that the start t{ansients
were not as severe as in the aft system. Therefore, no redesign of the forward RCS (FRCS) tank was
required. As mentioned earlier, during the first flight, as well as on all subsequent flights, the
digital autopilot (DAP) was constrained to firing a maximum of three thrusters simultaneously. A
study by the tank contractor, employing the latest model, indicates that a four-thruster capability
can be attained on normally filled aft tanks. A flve-thruster capability could be achieved on an
overfill ed aft 0V-099 tank; however, because of the problem associated with overfill, this capabil-
ity will not be pursued. The only major roadblock to deleting overfill is the RTLS, in which the
DAP can command as many as seven thrusters simultaneously. Additional analysis )erformed for RTLS
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FIGURE 5.- PRESSURE DROPS WITH MASKED SCREEN.
using avionic simulations has show_ that no significant quantities of gas are ingested. Therefore,
overfill will be eliminated by STS-8.
With the conclusion of this study, and the 0V-099 performance testing, the RCS tank performance
certification will be complete.
THRUSTERS
One of the major challenges In the Orbiter RCS deveTopment was design of the primary thruster.
The thrust size was almost an order of magnltu_ larger than that used on previous manned spacecraft
reaction control System. The large thrust size coupled with a need for 38 primary thrusters made
weight a prime consideration In component design. Because early technology work had shown that a
hydraulically operated valve was considerably lighter than a conventional solenoid valve for a Shut-
tle Orbiter-size engine, that concept was chosen for use on the primary thruster (fig. 6). The new
concept introduced new problems. The valve relied on pressure imbalances established by a pilot
poppet to provide the necessary opening force. These valve-actuatlng pressure imbalances could also
be created by transient-pressure waves generated by other thruster or isolation valve operation with-
in the system. These inadvertent, momentary valve openings were demonstrated to be safe in flight
but unacceptable for ground operation. Furthermore, it was discovered that gas entrapped in recesses
of the valve could slow down both opening and closing valve response and also increase the tendency
for the valve to "bounce" wlth pressure transients. To minimize the possibility of valve "bounce"
during ground operations, isolation valve operation was procedurally limited to cases in which the
pressure differential across the valve was below _ psid. To accommodate the slowed valve response
with the presence of gas in the valve, the minimum thruster firing time was increased from 40 to 80
milliseconds, which was still satisfactory for control purposes.
An ongoing problem that has a potential for conslderable downstream program impact is the ten-
dency of some primary thruster valves to leak when subjected to low temperature. The problem was
first discovered when liquid was observed to be dripping from the system-level test article engines
during a cold environment test. Additional testing at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC)
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FIGURE 6.- CROSS SECTION OF PRIMARY THRUSTER VALVE.
revealed that one out of three valves leaked when chilled from ambient temperature to 300 F. Further-
more, the leakage became progressively worse with increased cycling. Preliminary corrective action
in the form of a 40°-F screening test was introduced to eliminate "cold leakers." Continued investi-
gation of the problem indicated that the TFE Teflon underwent a marked change in thermal expansion
rate In the 6Bo- to 77O-F temperature range. Because machining, done as a part of seat fabrication,
was accomplished in this temperature range, some parts had insufficient seat material exposed at re-
duced temperature. The flat-seat, non-temperature-compensatlng design made the unit very sensitive
to temperature changes. Therefore, to further reduce susceptibility to cold leakage, two actions, in
addition to the screening, were implemented. First, the Teflon is machined at 320 F to ensure uni-
form dimensions with adequate seat matertal exposed at reduced temperatures. Second, the thruster
heater set points have been raised to maintain valve temperature above 600 F. Even with these ac-
tions Implemented, there have been instances of cold leakage when heater power had to be turned off
during ferry fltght operations. Whether the incidence of cold leakage increases as valve seat wear
occurs wtth use still remains to be seen and will determine whether additional work is required.
Another environment-induced development problem involved the requirement for the valve to be ca-
pable of withstanding salt fog exposure. Care was exhibited in selecting materials for the valve,
and all those selected (Inconel 718, Custom 455, and A-Z86) were individually compatible wlth salt
fog. However, when all the factors and materials _ were assembled, a galvanic crevice corrosion on the
Custom 455 occurred. The completed series of ingredients that resulted in.the corros!on was the
stacking of the three valve materials against etth_r of the thruster materials, titanium or
columbium, plus the addition of a propellant-soaked crevice around the valve seat, .and lastly, the
electrolyte, sodium chloride. Severe and rapid pitting occurred on the valve poppet _custom _bb_,
and leakage ensued. Results of material testing confirmed the four-material problem and suggested a
material change as a corrective action. Because the failure occurred late in the production process,
the first flight units had already been manufactured and shipped. This situation dictated consider-
ing an immediate corrective action for existing hardware and implementing the material change for
future replacements. The immediate corrective action was to keep the thrusters sealed a.gatnst mois-
ture and salt air intrusion by keeping plugs and desstcant protection _n p_ace at all t_mes wnen on
the ground. To date, this approach has been satisfactory, and the long-term solution has not been
pursued.
Another subtle material problem occurred in the fabrication of the injectors. During weterflow
tests of the injectors for the 0V-102 thrusters, water was observed to be externally leaking from the
injector adjacent to the acoustic cavities (fig. 7). No confirmed cause for the cracking was deter-
mined; however, an ultrasonic screening test was Invented to isolate the cracked injectors. The
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FIGURE 7.- IN3ECTOR CROSS SECTION.
screening test was tmposed at several stages tn the manufacturing process in hopes of determining the
cause. Durtng the manufacture of the 0V-103 hardware, the problem reoccurred and the screening test
paid off. With some good metallurgical Investigative efforts, tt was determined that the columbtum
was cracking because of hot salt stress corrosion and that fluorlde salt exposure, temerature, and
stress all had to be present for cracking to occur. The fluorfde salt was a residue from an inade-
quate rtnse of a chemical etch used tn preparation for _eldtng. The problem was solved by eliminat-
Ing the use of the etchant after reaching a certain stage of the injector fabrication process.
One of the latest challenges encountered tn the development of the Space Shuttle RCS thrusters
was a premature failure of the dtstltclde coating on the ve_nter engines (fig. 8). Coating failures
war ftrst experienced tn the component qualification program and later on the flight hardware. Fall,
ures occurred over quite a range of burn times. At first, tt was thought to be a single genertc prob-
lem with the coattng Itself, but as testtng and investigation progressed, tt was shown to be a multi-
faceted problom. The qualtffcatton engine coating spelled after 80 000 seconds of burn time, where-
as two of the 0V-102 engines developed coating defects at about 10 000 seconds of burn time. Thus,
it was theorized that not only burn time but thermal cycltng as well was critical. The qualifica-
tion and flight hardware both had approximately equal thermal cycles. This theory was negated
when one engine spelled at 10 thermal cycles and others _ere spall-fPee after more than 800 thermal
cycles. Evidence potnttng to one potential cause was revealed during an Inspection of the 0V-0gg
engines performed to document thetr condition before their ftrst flight. Two of the engines were
found to have defects, with nothlng Bore than acceptance-test burn ttme. Examination of the ground-
support throat plugs revealed that metallic ftngers on the plug had broken and dislodged pieces
from the ne, engtne coattng. These throat plugs _ere abandoned and new ones designed to p_eclude
high loads betng put tnto the coattng. It was now obvtous that the coating could have been and
probably was mechanically damaged tn some of the fatluros, but this mechanism did not explatn all
of them. Samples tested at the _SC Whtte Sands Test Facfltty {W_F) tn a special coattng test
that had never been e)_posed to any throat plugs developed coating defects. Further Investigation
determined that poor qualtty control tn manufacture of the combustion chamber was probably contribu-
ting to the early _earout. Ridges, undercuts, and smeared material _ere found tn the chamber before
coattng. Coattng over these imperfections was producing weak areas, which, when cycled, _e_e causing
coating pinholes or spalltng to occur. Combust|on chamber machining was subsequently revised to con-
trol Intersecting cuts, and the finishing cut now ts made tn one direction tn a stng]e pass. Use of
thts new technique minimizes meartng and rtdgtng. Chemtcal mtlltng was implemented before coating
to further remove any mars and ridges remaining from machining and to remove any contaminants buried
in the surface. Testing to vertfy the 1reproved manufacturing p_ocess is underway.
w
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FIGURE 8.- VERNIER THRUSTER COATING FLAW.
A/C MOTOR ISOLATION VALVES
An interesting subsystem interface issue that arose on the flight vehicle involves the RCS A/C
motor isolation valves and their control circuitry. The RCS isolation valves are ball valves that
are driven by high-speed alternating-current motors (fig. 9). The response of the ball is slow, ap-
proximately I second for full travel in either direction, but the motor is rotating at 8000 rpm. The
gear reduction is large, and large inertia force In the gear train is partly removed by a friction
brake upon stopping. The valve was built wlth microswltches for terminating power at the end of
valve travel. The original design accommodated the large inertia by removing power from the motor
before the mechanism came to rest. By this means, the ball and gear train could "coast down" before
impacting the friction energy absorber. The absorber was designed to marginally handle the antici-
pated inertia load. The valves cycled without problems when operated individually and had in fact
completed development testing and part of qualification llfe testing without mishap. However, when
used in the vehicle, the oxidizer and fuel Isolation valves were actuated as pairs. Power was le?t
on until the slowest of the two valves completed its cycle. Thi_ mode of operation drove the gear
train of the fastest valve hard into the energy absorber and left stall torque on the motor until
the slower valve completed travel and po_er was shut off. The added momentum of the gear train as a
result of powered impact with the energy absorber caused the absorber to recoil and produce a sudden
inelastic reaction load into the gear train. Repeated cycling of the paired valves could cause the
nylon teeth of the third-stage planetary gear to strip and, thus, disable the valve. The first in-
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FIGURE 9.- A/C MOTORVALVE CROSS SECTION.
dicatton of this problem occurred when the OV-102 forward module RCS was checked out at the NASA
John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The valves were being cycled wttha 2-second timing circuit,
and It was noticed that the elcroswltch feedbacks were intermittent. On closer investigation, it
was discovered that power in excess of l.lS seconds could cause intermittent open/close indications
because the gear train would backlash enough to cause an open circuit to occur on the elcroswltch.
Further investigation indicated that the vehicle wiring would leave power on for greater than 1.15
seconds and, therefore, could cause intermittent indications. Driving a valve beyond the elcroswltch
turnoff signal was known as a "hard cycle." Testing on the A/C motor valve was begun to pursue the
effects of "hard cycling" on "paired" valves. It was discovered that the reliable life of the valve
was no more than several cycles. Work was initiated on redesigning the gear train to accommodate the
larger loads. The resultant product was a new, all-metal gear train incorporating a magnetic brake
in the motor and a different, and significantly better, energy absorber for the inertia load, de-
signed to sustain the full inertia load plus motor stall torque drlvlng into the stop. Certifica-
tion testing of the new valve verified that the new configuration could achieve the required full
lO0-eission life in the hard-cycle mode.
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RCS SYSTEM-LEVEL DEVELOPMENT AND CERTIFICATION
A major challenge with any liquid propulsion system such as the Space Shuttle RCS is to verify
that all the components combined as a system operate as a unit during all expected operating modes
and that the interaction between components will not cause problems. A second significant activity
required on a system-level test article is the development and verification of all ground checkout
and servicing procedures necessary for a multiuse vehicle. To ensure that these goals were met and
also to verify system structural integrity, a major ground test program was performed on the RCS
(fig. 10). This ground test program included the following major elements.
1. FRCS and ARCS Breadboard Development Test-
2. FRCS and ARCS Development Tests
3. FRCS and ARCS Qualification Tests '"
4. FRCS Thruster Installation Tests
S. ARCS Pressure Panel Tests
6. FRCS and ARCS Vtbroacousttc Tests
I
The major objectives of these test program were as fo_ows.
1. FRCS and ARCS Breadboard Development-Test - Provide early system data to support the anal-
ysis and design efforts and to evaluate servicing and checkout procedures. Simulated prol_ellants
were used in this test.
FIGURE 10.- TYPICAL SYSTEM TEST ARTICLE (FRCS).
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2. FRCS and ARCS Development Tests - Conduct 12 test series on the FRCS and 11 test series on
the ARCS at WSTF to verify RCS design, including evaluation of steady-state and transient performance
under all operating conditions, and develop and evaluate servicing and checkout procedures. This was
the first actual system hot-fire testing on complete FRCS and ARCS test articles.
3. FRCS and ARCS Qualification Tests - Conduct sufficient test series on the FRCS and ARCS to
certify the system for development and operational flights. These tests were divided into Qual I
(STS-1), Qual II (operational flights), and Qua] III (OV-O99 and subsequent modifications). Thirteen
test series were perforated on the FRCS and 15 on the ARCS with each series approximatel.v equivalent
to one mission.
4. FRCS Thruster Installation Tests - Provide data for thermal and structural certification of
the complex RCS thruster installation. The firing tests were performed at simulated altitude at
WSTF, and the vlbroacoustic tests were performed at Rockwell International (RI).
5. •ARCS Pressure Panel Tests - Certify the RCS helium pressurization system for simulated se-
ries regulator failures including relief system limit testing.
6. FRCS and ARCS Vibroacoustic Tests - Provide data to certify FRCS and ARCS primary and second-
ary structure, components, and tubing for the acoustic environments experienced during ascent. The
FRCS test was conducted at RI and the ARCS at ,ISC. ,,
Numerous challenges resulted from the problems discovered during the ground test programs
listed. Some of the major challenges and the eventual technical solutions are discussed next°
The breadboard test program revealed two major problems requiring resolution.
= 1. Servicing procedures resulted in propellant residual entrapment in the helium pressurization
lines. Subsequent activation of the system by opening the fast-response helium isolation valves
produced pressure surges that would sometimes rupture the burst disk in the helium relief system.
This problem was solved procedurally for the OV-IO2 vehicle by implementing a series of pressure
cycles called "breathing cycles" which cleared the liquid from the helium lines. For 0V-099 and sub-
sequent vehicles, the problem was solved by a change in the helium system plumbing to add a separate,
dedicated propellant vent line.
4.
2. The ARCS breadboard test revealed that certain combinations of engine firings produced pres-
sure transients in the propellant feed system in excess of the design limits. The pulse characteris-
tics were also erratic under these conditions. As a result of this finding and parallel findings
from the development testing at ws'rF,the minimum pulse on/off duration and frequency were changed
from an initial value of 0.040 second on/O.040 second off with a maximum frequency of 12.5 hertz to
0.080 second on/O.080 second off with a maximum frequency of 6.25 hertz. This change resulted in
more propellant usage in some cases but eliminated the pressure transient concern and resulted in
much more repeatable pulse performance with the corresponding reduced risk of engine pressure spikes
and erroneous deselections by the Shuttle RM system. This change was a major step in improving the
reliability of the RCS.
Challenges resulting from RCS system-level development and qualification testing were numerous.
Some of the major challenges involved engine valve problems, servicing and activation problems,
propellant-tank checkout, propellant-tank surge-_flow evaluation, and subsystem llfe certification.
The first major challenge occurred very early in development testing and involved engine/system
incompatibilities. The initial plan was to fill the RCS tanks with propellant and the manifolds with
low-pressure gas. During system activation, the propellant isolation valves were opened and the gas
was compressed; these ections left large gas bubbles in the RCS feed system and engine valves. As
discussed in another section of this report, the primary engine valve operation is adversely affecte-_
by gas entrapment. During initial FRCS system-level testing, major problea_ occurred including
missed pulses, failure of valves to close between pulses, long ignition delays, cold flows of one pro-
pellant due to oxidizer and fuel valve mismatch, and valve bounce due to system pressure transients.
This inefficient operation also caused concern for potential hard-start (spike) problems resulting
from residue accumulatlon in the combustion chambers. The following plan was implemented to solve
these problems.
I. Change the loading procedure to a vacuum-fill process to eliminate gas bubbles.
2. Perform bench tests on the thruster valves to map performance characteristics as a function
of gas entrapment/flow, static and dynamic pressure, propellant saturation, etc.
3. Install linear variable differential transformers on some thruster valves on the FRCS and
ARCS test articles to determine effects of gas bubbles, saturated propellants, and system pressure
transients.
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4. Changeminimum pulse on and off times from 0.040 second to 0.0_0 second.
5. Run system-level tests with vacuum-filled manlfolds and saturated propellants to verify ade-
quacy of modification.
6. Perform single engine pulse tests at altitude simulating conditions seen in step S to deter-
mine whether oxidizer and fuel residuals cause problems at altltude.
This program was successful in characterizing the valve and valve/system interactions. The test
program also revealed that the corrective actions of vacuum filling and changing the minimum pu.lse
time were adequate to allow the thruster valve to be used for flight without major valve or _ystem de-
sign changes.
Problem of engine valve leakage at cold temperatures and low pressure and engine valve bounce
caused by upstream isolation valve or quick-disconnect cycles were also dtscovere(_ in system-level
testing. These problems were solved by procedural controls and are discussed more fully in the sec-
tion entitled "Thrusters."
Checkout of the RCS propellant-tank surface-tension acquisition screens proved to be another
major challenge. For the screens to perfom properly in flight, there must not be any holes in the
screen that will cause a reduction of the bubble-point pressure. It is desirable to have a technique
that allows contingency and periodic checkout of the screens during operations without removing the
propellant tanks or using fluids other than the propellants. The basic process proposed for this
checkout involves filling the tanks with propellants,-dr_Inlng them without drying the propellant
from the screens, and then determining the bubble point (pressure at which gas penetrates the wet
screen surface) through the special checkout ports provided for this purpose. This process proved to
be fairly easy to implement for the fuel tank because of the low vapor pressure of MMH. Implementing
the process for the oxidizer tank, however, proved to be a very difficult task because of the high
vapor pressure of NTO. All initial attempts to check out screens on the system level with oxidizer
proved to be unsuccessful because the screens dried out. This challenge was met by implementing a
special test program on the tank alone with slmulated system-level checkout access plumbing and
valves. This approach a11owed for experimentation with thermal control, tank orientation, and propel-
lant saturation level of the nitrogen gas introduced into the tank. This approach finally revealed
the key controls that must be used to allow checkout with oxidizer. The most important parameter
requiring control is the saturation level of the gas. The incoming pressurant gas (nitrogen) must be
saturated with propellant. Second, the incoming gas must be at the same temperature as, or warmer
than, the tank, and third, the tank pressure should be in the 60- to 70-psi range. The concept was
then proven on system-level tests, and current plans are to implement it for the operational phase of
the program at KSC.
Test effort on the system level caused the development of some very effective techniques for
evaluating the complex surface-tension acquisition devices. The use of X-rays was found to be very
effective in determining the locations of propellants in the tank for evaluating performance, loading
and drain procedures, and potential acquisition devlce gross damage. Elaborate instrumentation con-
cepts were also developed to evaluate surge-flow pressure differentials in the tank. These were used
--:._:.::,.::.:;i to evaluate pressure differentials for high flow rates into and out of the tank associated with
::.. .. ._ crossfeed/Interconnect operations and propellant manifold repressurization. High-response oiezoele_-
--I.'T i•._] tric instrumentation was also used to determine differenti_ pressures across the screens to evaluate
_iL!ci__}i_!:_!_!i=......__ engine start transient effects in the tank.
,.._.I::..._.;:,K.:,I_The ARCS vlbroacoustlc test revealed a problem very late in the certification program that
J required extensive effort to solve. Initial testing on an ARCS pod structure revealed that vibration
" _,-__::levels on individual components and zones in the pod were higher than had been previously predicted
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Another challenge associated with system-leve_ testing involved llfe certification for 10 years
and 100 missions. Obvlously, a 10-yeer/1oo-mlsslon life test would be very expensive. Therefore,
the concept used was to certify the individual components in bench-type environments for 100 missions
of cycle life and vibration exposure and to run short, 90-day screening tests for propellant compati-
blltty. The components and the system were then tested in a development program representing 11 to
13 missions over an approximately g-month perlod. This test was followed by a quallflcatlon test pro-
gram representing 13 to 15 missions spread over a 3-year period. Including other special tests, the
qualification hardware was exposed to 4 to 5 years of operation. All operations on the systems were
designed to be reprosentattve of actual Space Shuttle servicing, flight, and repair procedures. The
acoustic test articles were exposed to a full ZOO-mission or more equivalent exposure in a short time
period except for the FRCS module, which was exposed for only 10 missions and analyzed for the re-
maintng gO missions. All failures or problems were analyzed for any ltfe-ltmlttng indications,
and, if a llfe limit was indicated, it was so noted and identified as llmlted-llfe hardware. The
described approach was than used for lO-year/lOO-mtssion certification wtth any exceptions being
noted.
andwerehigherthanthe levels used for component certification. Thts pod was originally equipped
with "mass simulated," nonfunctional components with the idea that the levels would be equal to or
less than the levels used in component tests. Therefore, component tests could be used for certifica-
tion. Since the levels were higher, a decision was made to use the vtbroacousttc pod for component
certification. This decision required a last minute change to install functional components in the
pod and complete the component and system certification in this manner. Since the levels were higher
tn the ARCS, test results could also be used to certify the FRCS components for 100 missions. The
FRCS had only been tested for 10 missions as a system.
RCS INTERFACES
The Orbiter RCS is the most complex RCS ever designed. To use tt effectively requires major RCS
interfaces with avionics/software, wiring, instrumentation, thermal control, and structures sub-
systems. A major challenge in the RCS design was to ensure that compatible interfaces exist within
these areas. Although difficult interface challenges existed in each of the areas, perhaps the most
difficult was the RCS/avlonics/software interface. Only this interface will be discussed here. Prin-
cipal functions performed in the Shuttle avionics/software for the RCS are redundancy management,
quantity monitoring, RCS crossfeed sequencing, OMS-to-RCS interconnect sequencing and gaging, FRCS
propellant dump, trickle-current testing, and system monitoring and annunciation functions. All
these functions required extensive exchange of Informetlon between subsystems to ensure that the soft-
ware and the avionics hardware were compatible with the RCS hardware in terms of timing, sequencing,
limit sensing, redundancy requirements, etc. The most complex avionics/software interface is the
area of redundancy management. The purpose of the RM system is to monitor the 44 RCS engines, an-
nunclate and isolate failures, and reconflgure the system to maintain vehicle control during all mis-
sion phases. This function is necessary to effectively maintain the RCS fail-operational/fall-safe
_redundancy. The major elements of the final system design are as follows.
I. Fail-off detection - compares computer fire command with engine chamber pressure feedback to
determine whether engine has fired. If no response occurs in en appropriate time, the engine is de-
clared failed-off, annunciated to the crew, and taken out of the available Jet table in the computers.
2. Fail-on detection - compares jet driver output with computer fire command to determl'ne
whether an engine is firing with no command. If a failed-on engine is detected, it is annunciated
to the crew so that the appropriate manifold may be isolated to prevent excessive propellant loss.
3. Valve leak detection - monitors engine fuel and oxidizer injector temperatures to determine
whether engine valve leakage is occurring. If the temperature of the oxidizer injector tube is below
30o F or of the fuel is below 20o F because of rapid propellant evaporation, a leak Is indicated.
For a leak indication, the problem Is annunciated to the crew and the engine is taken out of the
available jet table. The crew maY then manually close the appropriate isolation valves if propellant
loss is excessive.
4. Manifold status monitor - monitors RCS manifold isolation valve positions to determine
whether valves are open or closed. If the valves are closed, the engines on that manifold are
removed from the available Jet table.
5. Jet fault llmlt monitor - limits number of Jets which may be automatically removed from the
available Jet table in response to failure Inc_Icatlons. This function is designed to ensure that the
RM system will not automatically remove engines to levels at which insufficient control authority
exists.
All RM functions may be overridden by the crew in all phases except for ascent, for which only
limited override capability is available. To date, this system has been very effective in detecting
RCS engine problems and managing RCS redundancy in flight.
The other major avionics/software interfaces are now briefly described. Quantity monitoring
uses RCS helium and phopellant-tank pressure and temperature measurements to calculate and display
the RCS propellant status at all times using the pressure/volume/temperature relationship to deter-
mine the quantity of helium gas that has been transferred from the helium tank to the propellant
tank. The RCS crossfeed sequence provides automatic sequencing of 28 R_S/OMS valves to feed RCS en-
gines in both aft pods from the RCS propellant tanks in a single pod. The sequence will also recon-
figure to normal feed and I$ operational only in ascent and entry phases. The OMS-to-RCS intercon-
nect sequencing and gaging performs the OHS/RCS valve sequencing required to feed OMS propellants to
RCS engines during abort dumps and to reconflgure to normal feed after the dump is completed. During
on-orbit operations of normal missions, the OHS-to-RCS interconnect sequence initiates OMS-to-RCS
gaging and automatically pressurizes the OMS tanks as required. The on-orblt valve sequencing is a
manual operation. The FRCS propellant dump sequence provides capability for the crew to dump the
FRCS propellant through opposing Y-axls engines for center-of-gravity control. The trlckle-current
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test is used to check the electrical circuits that provide voltage to fire the RCS engines. Various
RCS pressures and temperatures are limit sensed, displayed, and annunciated by the avionic/software
interface to alert the crew of potential RCS problems.
OPERATIONS
Operations challenges for the RCS can be divided into two major categories: ground operations
and flight operations. More emphasis is placed on ground operations because most major operations
challenges have occurred in that area. As an introduction to ground operations, the basic opera-
tional concept for the RCS and the OMS is described.
The basic design concept for the hypergollc systems with their toxic, fl_mnable propellants is
to include the systems =in modules or pods that can be removed from the Shuttle Orbiter and taken to
a dedicated maintenance facility for hazardous repair or checkout operations. This facility is
called the Hypergolic Maintenance Facility (HMF). By performing hazardous operations in the HMF, the
work can be done in parallel with other Orbiter work and, thus, valuable turnaround time between
flights can be saved. The HMF is also used to perform lengthy checkout operations, whether hazardous
or not, to save serial turnaround time. The modules or pods are also provided with access panels and
numerous plumbing access connections to enable performance of most checkout functions in the Orbiter
Processing Facility (OPF) without removal from the vehicle. The decision on whether to perform re-
pair or checkout in the OPF or the HMF is usually based on access and turnaround time considerations.
Development of ground checkout philesophy has been_a major challenge for a reusable system that
contains highly corrosive propellants, is used on a continuous basis in flight, and has considerable
redundancy. The general philosophy that has been developed is as follows. A complete electrical and
mechanical checkout on the FRCS module and the ARCS pods is performed by the manufacturer before the
units are delivered to be installed on the orbiter. The interfacing orbiter electrical and instrumen-
tation wiring is also checked out using module and pod simulators before the actual hardware is in-
stalled. The most critical components and the system plumbing integrity are checked again in the
HMF before final installation on the Orbiter. After the module and pods are Installed for the first
Orbiter flight, the electrical components are checked for proper end-to-end channellzatlon where pos-
sible by actual physical response, e.g., flow, pressure, or temperature response. The system is thee
loaded with propellants and helium on the launch pad. During the actual flight, the system pressures,
temperatures, quantities, and valve positions are monitored closely for any indication of malfunction.
Special procedures are also used to get as much component functional data as is reasonably possible
by changing from one operational component to a redundant component during each mission; this is done
with regulator paths, heaters, and engines. Special hot-fire tests are also performed to check out
engines that might not normally be used. Use of this technique verifies the functional capability of
as many components as possible to reduce ground checkout requirements. After the Orbiter lands, com-
ponent checkout is performed on a very limited number of components every fltght based on their crit-
Icality and whether they can be checked out in flight. Most components are only checked out on a
S- or lO-mission basis to screen for unexpected deterioration. The system plumbing is leak checked
by monitoring for pressure decay at normal turnaround pressures after every flight. The engine cham-
ber and nozzle coating is also inspected for defects after every flight. By using the described ap--
proach,the turnaroundtime isminimizedwithoutexcessivesacrificein reliability.
One of the first major challenges encountered in actual operations was the need to provide rain
protection for some of the orbiter engines aftj_r the protective structure was moved away and the pro-
tective ground covers were removed from the RCS engines. The requirement was to protect the three
upward-faclng engines and eight of the left side engines from rainwater accumulation on the launch
pad. The upfiring engine covers had to prevent _ater accumulation that could freeze in the injector
passages during ascent. The side-firing engine covers had to prevent water from accumulating in the
bottom of the chamber and to protect the chamber pressure-senslng ports. Freezing of accumulated
water during ascent could block the sensing port and cause the engine to be declared "failed off"
when it was first used. The original design concept was to install Teflon plugs in the engine throats
(side-firing) and a combination Teflon plug tied to a Teflon plate that covered the nozzle exit
(upflring). This concept added vehicle weight, required special procedures to eject the plugs in
flight, and had the rtsk of accidental ejection tn ascent that could damage ttles. The second con-
cept evaluated involved Teflon sheets that were glued to the nozzle extts and pulled off by lanyards
when the crew access structure was retracted. This concept was considered to be unnecessarily com-
plex and did not provide protection all the way to launch or for a11 the engines. The flna_ solution
was a novel approach of using ordinary plastlc-coated freezer paper cut to fit the exlt plane of the
nozzle and glued in place (fig. 11). Tests proved this concept would provide a reltable seal under
all expected rain and wind conditions. Wind-tunnel tests revealed that the covers could blow off in
ascent before Mach 1. The covers were, therefore, very lo, cost, st_le, and added no significant
weight.
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FIGURE 11.- PAPER ENGINE COVER.
The next major operational challenge involved RCS engine valve leakage problem during ground
turnaround. Following the first orbttal flight of the Shuttle, the FRCS module and the ARCS pods
were removed for inspection and checkout. A test was performed to evaluate the capabfltty to evacu-
ate the manifolds after the), had been drained of propellant but not completely dried. Following this
test, four RCS engine oxidizer valves developed htgh gas-leak rates. Thts leakage caused great con-
ce_ because the leak rate was high enough to indicate that the valves might leak liquid. To under-
stand the problem, one of the engines was removed for faJ-lure analysis. This failure analysis, in
combination with the analysis performed on another engine removed for a different reason, revealed
the causes for the leakages. The valves had l_ Teflon seal height and some nitrate deposits in the
seal area. The drying of the oxidizer systemby evacuation caused Teflon shrinkage, which, in combina-
tion with the nitrates, caused leakage. It was expected that rewettlng the seal with liquid oxidizer
would swell the seal and dissolve the nitrates and, therefore, prevent liquid leakage. Experience
has shown that this does happen. The KSC turnaround procedures ere changed to preclude drying the
RCS manifolds by evacuation unless they are to be refilled immediately _th liquid. The problem of
oxidizer valve gas leakage during turnaround has not recurred.
Prevention of iron nitrate contamination in the RCS oxidizer proved to be another operational
challenge. Storage of oxidizer in tanks and plumbing that contain iron has been found to cause iron
contamination in the propellant. This contamination can fo_ a nitrate that can precipitate and
cause valve leakage, filter blockage, interference in sliding fits, etc. Several RCS con_onent fail-
ures were _lated to this problem; the most prominent one was the failure of a ground-half quick dis-
connect to close resulting in an oxidizer spill on the launch pad Just before STS-2. A progre was
implemented at WSTF to determine the parameters that cause iron nitrate formation and then to Imple-
rant procedures to prevent their formatlon in Shuttle propellants. This program resulted in under-
standing the relationship between iron, water, and nitric oxide content and nitrate fon_atlon.
Also, production and storage controls and filtration techniques to remove the iron were developed.
With the implementation of these controls, the iron nitrate problem appears to have been solved.
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Another major operational challenge was development of the best procedures for ferry flight of
the Orbiter RCS after a mission. Because of the initial concern for engine valve leakage at cold tem-
peratures and propellant slosh effects on tank screens, the RCS propellants were drained at the land-
ing site before ferry flight. Following STS-2, the drain operation had two valve sequencing errors
that subjected the RCS propellant tanks to potentially damaging surge flows. These errors were attri-
buted to the remote location of the drain site and the difficulty of communications between the drain
site and KSC, where the systems data were available. Consequently, the operations site (KSC) recom-
mended that the propellant not be drained before ferry flight. This recommendation was accomplished
after STS-3 by turning the RCS thruster heaters and FRCS area heaters on through a special hookup to
the carrier airplane. The ca_'rier airplane was also instrumented with a special accelerometer to
monitor for excessive slosh loads on the RCS tanks. A recognized risk was taken that 15 to 25 per-
cent of the RCS thruster valves might leak as much as 10 cm_/hr of liquid propellant during ferry
flight even with the heaters on. This approach has been successful on all ferry flights from STS-3
to the present with only minor leakage occurring in a few engines. Damaging slosh loads have never
been encountered.
The incidents that occurred during draining at the landing site created another major operations
challenge. There was concern that the RCS tank screens and/or internal bulkhead structure might have
been damaged by the surge flow into the tanks. Since the RCS tank checkout procedures by bubble-
point technique had not been fully developed at that time and no ground-sui_port equipment (GSE) was
available to perform in-place tank checkout, the only way to check the tanks was to remove them and
send them to the manufacturer for checkout. This action would have been a major impact to the pro-
gram schedule and to hardware deliveries for subsequent vehicles. To avoid this impact, a decision
was made to attempt to duplicate the surge incidents on the ARCS test system at WSTF and then to
check out the test tanks to determine whether damage occurred. This resulting test program required
a meticulous duplication of all the procedures that had been performed on the systems at the landing
site. This duplication was particularly challenging since data were not available during some pe-
riods at the landing site and the crossfeed plumbing and the GSE were different at WSTF than on the
Orbiter. The test program was successfully completed, and results indicated that the tanks on the ve-
hicle were not damaged. This testing resulted in saving about 2 months on the Shuttle schedule, since
the tests at WSTF were run in parallel with the other Orbiter operations and no checkout times were
required for the tanks.
The next major operations challenge occurred after STS-3, when the Shuttle Orbiter landed at
White Sands, New MexiCo. Just after landing, high winds blew gypsum sand into the RCS engines before
they could be covered. This event caused concern that the injector orifices could be blocked and
thus cause unstable combustion and/or improper cooling of the combustion chamber walls. Results of
bench tests revealed that the gypsum would migrate into the passages of the injector, particularly on
the upfiring engines, where the gypsum accumulated on the injector face. Results of bench tests also
revealed that the gypsum would harden and cake when exposed to propellants or water such as seen in
ferry flight (cold leakage and moisture from the air). To solve this problem, a plan was implemented
to remove and replace all nine of the upfiring engines and to remove three horizontal-firing engines.
The three horizontal-firing engines were inspected and test fired to ensure that no detrimental ef-
fects were seen. Data from these three engines were then used to clear the other horizontal engines
for flight.
A general program goal during the operational phase has been to improve/reduce turnaround
time and operations. The RCS program has been very successful in this area to date, and additional
reductions are expected in the near future. Major turnaround improvements to date include the
fo 11owl ng. -
I. Deleted screen drying requirement - 16_hours.
2. Developed computer program to track nitric oxide content in oxidizer and thus deleted re-
quirement for postflight oxidizer samples - 8 hours.
3. Deleted requirement to drain and refill tanks and manifolds between flights - 2 to 3 days.
Turnaround improvements in work include the following.
I. Delete overfill requirement on the ARCS propellant tanks - I to 2 days.
2. Improve loading procedures - 8 hours.
These improvements have been achieved primarily by implementlng special programs on the test articles
at WST_ to ensure that the changes are accepteble. The testing has also been supplemented by anal-
ysis efforts in some cases.
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Numerous problems or challenges and their solutions have been identified in this paper. The so-
lutions to the problems have produced satisfactory operational hardware. The real achievement in com-
pleting the development program, however, was not in the final hardware itself but in what was learned
to make that hardware possible. Those real achievements on this program must become the routine work-
ing tools for the next major effort so that the creative engineers of tomorrow may spend their time
constructively in dealing with tomorrow's challenges.
i
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